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The concept of reward prediction error
(RPE) learning has been extremely in-
fluential in the nondeclarative memory
literature, but the role of RPEs in de-
clarative memory has only recently
begun to be explored.Learning based on reward prediction error (RPE) was originally proposed in the
context of nondeclarativememory.We postulate that RPEmay support declarative
memory as well. Indeed, recent years have witnessed a number of independent
empirical studies reporting effects of RPE on declarative memory. We provide a
brief overview of these studies, identify emerging patterns, and discuss open
issues such as the role of signed versus unsigned RPEs in declarative learning.Two main approaches to measure
RPE in declarative memory have been
developed. In the reward-prediction ap-
proach, reward is iteratively sampled by
the experimenter from a statistical distri-
bution and predicted by the subject.
In the multiple-repetition approach,
subjects see the same memoranda
repeatedly and estimate their proba-
bility of success.
Behaviorally, the reward-prediction
approach has mainly yielded signed
RPE signatures, whereas the multiple-
repetition paradigm has mainly yielded
unsigned RPE signatures. However,
there are exceptions, and neural
(electroencephalography, fMRI) para-
digms have yielded both in single studies.
An RPE perspective provides testable
hypotheses on why reward and reward
prediction manipulations may improve
or impair declarative learning.
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A tennis player knows how to perform a perfect serve and also knows the opponent’s name. But
how are these two types of ‘knowing’ similar, if at all? It is thought that the human brain houses at
least two broad and distinct memory systems [1], each with its own learning algorithms and neural
correlates. The first is nondeclarative (or habit, or implicit)memory (see Glossary). The second is
declarative (or, in humans, propositional, or explicit) memory. The computational principle of
reward prediction error (RPE)-based learning [2,3] is generally thought to drive nondeclarative
learning. By contrast, until recently, RPE was not studied in the context of declarative memory.
However, several empirical studies have reported effects of RPE on declarative memory as well,
suggesting that some of the same computational principles shape nondeclarative and declarative
memory systems. Here, we review these recent studies and discuss the most important open
questions concerning RPEs and declarative memory. First, however, we provide a brief overview
of the computational models linking RPE with nondeclarative learning.
RPE and Nondeclarative Learning
One of the most influential theories in current cognitive neuroscience is predictive coding [4,5].
According to this account, the brain generates predictions about its own percepts, actions,
and cognition in order to learn about, build models of, and navigate the world [6]. A key concept
in predictive coding is the prediction error (PE). Specifically, in order to generate accurate
predictions, the brain needs to set a number of parameters (e.g., encoded in its synaptic
connections). PEs allow updating such parameters.
Predictions can bemade about several variables, such as tomorrow’s weather, the next action I (or
somebody else) will perform, our partner’s mood, and so forth. One particularly relevant variable to
make predictions about is reward; a PE in reward (by definition) is an RPE. The concept of RPEs
has been very influential in nondeclarative learning. In particular, RPEs have been implemented in
a wide range of computational models. For example, to account for blocking in nondeclarative
learning, Rescorla and Wagner (RW; [7]; Box 1) developed their now-classic model according to
which learning depends on PE. Specifically, synaptic strength increases when a reward is better
than expected, but synaptic strength decreases when the reward is worse than expected.
Hence, the valence of the RPE matters [signed reward prediction error (SRPE)].
Further computational development of RW led to the temporal difference (TD; Box 1)
reinforcement learning model [3]. The TD model improved on the RW model because it388 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, May 2020, Vol. 24, No. 5 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.02.009
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Glossary
Blocking: in a blocking experiment,
an event A is consistently followed by
an unconditional stimulus (US).
Subsequently, an additional event B is
added to A (again followed by the US).
After conditioning, it is observed that
the animal in the experiment has not
learned the association between B
and the US. In the Rescorla-Wagner
rule, the interpretation is that event A
blocks this B–US association.
Specifically, due to event A, the
appearance of the US is no longer
surprising.
Declarative memory: memory for
facts and events (‘knowing what’)
that can (at least in humans) be
(consciously) declared. It is typically
considered to consist of episodic
memory (memory for single episodes)
and semantic memory (memory for
information aggregated across
several episodes). The process of
acquisition of declarative memory is
called ‘declarative learning.’ Encoding
declarative memories can happen
rapidly, typically after only a single
exposure, and relies heavily on the
hippocampus [66].
Nondeclarative memory:
nondeclarative learning is an umbrella
term for the acquisition of different
types of knowledge, including
procedural memory (‘knowing how’).
This involves acquiring a motor or
cognitive skill (procedure) by means
of repeated practice (e.g., learning to
play tennis).
Prediction error (PE): difference
between the actual value of some
variable and predicted value of that
variable (i.e., actual value minus
predicted value).
Reward prediction error (RPE):
prediction error where the relevant
variable is reward (i.e., actual reward −
predicted reward). See also Prediction
error.
Signed: in mathematics, signed means
that the sign of a number is taken into
consideration (e.g., −3, +3). In the
context of SRPEs, it indicates that we
take the valence (positive versus
negative RPEs) into account.
Theta phase synchronization:
synchronization of two brain areas in the
theta frequency (4–8 Hz). Such
synchronization can be achieved by
making the theta phase of the two areas
identical so that theta waves in both
areas ‘go up and down’ together.
Box 1. Models of Learning
Rescorla-Wagner Model
This model [7] describes learning the value (expected reward) of specific events (say, events A and B). This information is
encoded in their associative strength to a ‘value’ unit, symbolized aswA andwB for events A and B, respectively. Specifically,
based on whether events A and B occur (xA = 1 and xB = 1, respectively) or not (xA = 0 and xB = 0, respectively), an additive
prediction is made about the occurrence of reward (V = xA × wA + xB × wB). When reward finally occurs (or not), a RPE is
calculated (R – V), where occurrence of reward (denoted R) is typically coded as R = 0 (when there is no reward) or R = 1
(when there is reward). This RPE is then used to change the connection strength between cells encoding A and B on the
one hand and reward on the other: Δwi = α × xi × (R – V), with i ∈ {A, B}. After repeated application of this learning rule,
the weights wA and wB allow the model to accurately predict reward, based on the (A, B) input combination.
Temporal Difference Model
The Rescorla-Wagner model can only learn from external feedback (R – V). This is computationally inefficient because re-
ward may not be delivered at each time point when relevant information is provided to the organism. In temporal difference
learning [3], learning can also occur if the prediction of reward changes between two time points t and t + 1. Formally, the
learning rule becomes (nowwith explicit time index t):Δwi(t) = α × xi(t) × [R(t + 1) + γV(t + 1) – V(t)], with i ∈ {A, B}. If γ = 0, the
rule reduces to the Rescorla-Wagner rule. In case γ N 0, learning can also proceed at times t when no actual reward was
delivered, rendering the algorithm more powerful than the Rescorla-Wagner rule.
Pearce-Hall Model
According to this model [12], learning only occurs when a reward is surprising. Specifically, it uses the absolute value of an
RPE (‘different from expected’ signal), consistent with an unsigned RPE approach. Formally, (one variant of) the learning
rule can be written as: Δwi(t) = xi(t) × R(t) × |R(t) – V(t)|.
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesallows learning also when the reward is not immediately present. However, the main suc-
cess of the RPE concept as implemented in TD was probably because of its close match
to neurophysiological data. In particular, dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental
area (VTA) implement a TD-like RPE signature of reward processing [8,9]. In recent
years, the role of TD-based RPEs in nondeclarative learning has become well established
in psychology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence. For example, deep reinforcement
learning models use TD-based RPEs to solve tasks (e.g., playing Atari games) that were
long considered beyond the capacity of artificial agents [10,11].
In contrast to the RW and TDmodels that are SRPE based, Pearce and Hall proposed that learn-
ing occurs whenever reward is surprising [either better or worse; that is, different from expected,
consistent with an unsigned reward prediction error (URPE); Box 1] [12]. It is noteworthy that
normative, Bayesian models of learning exhibit features of both. For example, the Kalman filter
[13] updates its estimates on the basis of SRPEs, but its learning rate [i.e., the extent to which pa-
rameters (such as synaptic weights) are updated] is driven by uncertainty, which can be esti-
mated via URPEs [14–16]. Empirical signatures of both SRPE and URPE have been observed
in the brain [17]. In summary, the concept of PE, and specifically of RPE, has turned out to be fruit-
ful for understanding nondeclarative learning at neurophysiological, behavioral, and computa-
tional levels.
RPE in Declarative Learning
Although the role of RPEs in nondeclarative learning has been studied extensively and
formalized in a number of computational models, their role in declarative learning has only
recently become a topic of interest. Two main approaches exist for elucidating the RPE effect
on declarative learning (for an overview, see Table 1). First, in the reward-prediction approach
(Box 2), a statistical distribution determines the probability of reward. The participant knows or
estimates this reward distribution. Thus, the participant can make a prediction about reward,
and, based on the prediction, an RPE can be generated. Studies using reward prediction
can be approximately ordered on the basis of the difficulty of this prediction, and we will discussTrends in Cognitive Sciences, May 2020, Vol. 24, No. 5 389
Unsigned: unsigned means that the
sign is not considered (i.e., absolute
value is taken; for example, −3 and +3
both have an unsigned value of 3). See
also Signed.
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesthem in that order (easy to difficult). In one of the first studies to use this approach, each of three
cues was linked to a different reward value [18]. A medium reward led to improved recognition
when it was better than predicted (i.e., when it was preceded by a cue indicating that low or
medium reward was equally likely to follow) relative to when it was worse than predicted
(i.e., preceded by a cue indicating that high or medium reward was equally likely to follow),
consistent with an SRPE effect. However, later work could not replicate the SRPE effect in
this specific experimental paradigm [18,19].
A second implementation of the reward-prediction approach is the recent variable-choice para-
digm (Figure 1A, Key Figure, and Box 2) [20]. Here, participants learn Dutch–Swahili word asso-
ciations under different RPE value conditions. (See [20] for an overview of all RPEs in this design.)
Predicting the reward probability is again quite easy; participants can deduce it from the number
of eligible options. Behaviorally, memory performance showed an SRPE effect in declarative
learning: Recognition accuracy and certainty increased linearly with larger and more positive
RPEs (Figure 1B). These results were replicated with image–word associations [20] and face–
word associations [21].Table 1. Nonexhaustive Overview of Studies on Reward Prediction Error in Declarative Memory
Approach Task and stimuli SRPE/URPE Effect on
memory
Refs
Reward prediction Each of three cues (colored squares) is followed by one of two potential reward values
(medium-low, medium-high, and low-high), so a medium reward can be better or worse
than expected. After reward feedback, a novel (indoor or outdoor) scene is presented.
Scene recognition is probed after a 1-day delay.
SRPE Positive [68]
Reward prediction On each trial, participants see one Dutch word together with four (trial-novel) Swahili words
and choose a translation from either one, two, or four of these Swahili words. Manipulating
the number of eligible options (one, two, or four) and whether a trial is rewarded allowed
manipulation of RPEs. For example, in the case of a four-option rewarded trial, participants
experience an RPE of 1 – ¼ = 0.75; in case of a two-option nonrewarded trial, participants
experience an RPE of 0 – ½ = −0.50.
SRPE Positive [20]
(see also
Figure 1A,B)
Reward prediction A cue is presented with two targets linked to different reward values. Subjects must (learn to
predict and) choose the high-value target. Trial-novel images are shown during subsequent
reward feedback. Image memory is probed afterwards via old/new judgments.
SRPE Positive [22]
Reward prediction Participants track the reward associated with different indoor and outdoor scenes. On
each trial, participants predict the reward (for a particular scene) and subsequently receive
feedback about their estimate. From this difference (feedback − predicted reward), an RPE
can be calculated. Scene memory is probed after this initial task via old/new judgments.
URPE Positive [24]
(see also
Figure 1C,D)
Reward prediction On each trial, participants see a value and a stimulus (animate or inanimate) for that trial
and decide to play or pass on that trial (Figure 1E). After each choice, the image is shown
with reward feedback. Afterwards, recognition memory for the images is probed via
old/new judgments.
SRPE Positive [40]
(see also
Figure 1E,F)
Reward prediction Participants track the drifting reward probability of colored squares, which are overlaid with
incidental trial-unique images and followed by feedback. Recognition memory for the
images is probed via old/new judgments after a 1-day delay.
SRPE Negative [23]
Multiple repetition Participants are presented with questions for which they have to generate an answer and
rate their confidence, followed by a surprise retest.
URPE Positive [31]
Multiple repetition Participants are presented with general information questions. In a first test phase,
participants provide answers and rate their confidence. In the subsequent phase, subjects
receive feedback about their answers. Finally, participants are retested on a subset of
questions in a second test phase.
URPE Positive [67]
Multiple repetition Participants study a text and are tested after 2 days, at which time they also provide confidence
ratings for their answers. On a small fraction of trials, participants receive false feedback
(i.e., trials that were answered correctly but labelled as false) and receive novel feedback (i.e., a
novel ‘correct’ answer) on those trials. A second (incidental) test is given after 7 days.
URPE Positive [32]
Abbreviations: SRPE, signed reward prediction error; URPE, unsigned reward prediction error.
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Box 2. How to Generate and Measure RPEs: Experimental Approaches
Reward-Prediction Approach
Here, participants must both learn declarative information (e.g., word pairs) and simultaneously estimate a (potentially non-
stationary) reward distribution throughout the task [23,24,40]. In some cases, the correct RPE can be easily derived
analytically; in other cases, RPE can only be calculated after fitting a reinforcement learning model and deriving the RPEs
from the model estimates [23,40]. One example of a reward-prediction approach is the variable-choice paradigm. In the
variable-choice paradigm [20,33] (see Figure 1A in main text), participants learn stimulus pairs, such as Dutch–Swahili
word pairs or image–Swahili stimulus pairs [20]. In the former example, on each trial, a Dutch word is shown together
with four Swahili words. Critically, the number of eligible options is manipulated. In the one-option, two-option, and
four-option conditions, one, two, or four Swahili words are eligible (framed), respectively, and the probability of choos-
ing the correct translation is thus 100%, 50%, or 25%, respectively. Feedback is given on every trial. Signed and un-
signed trial-by-trial RPEs are calculated on the basis of the difference between actual and predicted reward (see
Glossary). Memory is probed in a subsequent recognition test.
Multiple-Repetition Approach
Here, general information questions are repeatedly presented, and an RPE is estimated on the basis of previous presen-
tations of each question. For example, in [32], participants first studied a text and subsequently received (multiple-choice)
questions about the text. After each question, they rated confidence and received feedback. The trial-by-trial PE was cal-
culated using the confidence rating and feedback. Hypercorrection effect studies also typically use a multiple-repetition
paradigm [29,67].
Trends in Cognitive SciencesIn another instantiation of the reward-prediction approach, participants actively track and esti-
mate the reward probability distribution. Here, on each trial, they experience an RPE relative to
that (estimated) distribution (Figure 1C,D, and Box 2) [22–24]. On the basis of this feedback,
participants can update their estimate for subsequent trial estimates. For example, in one study
[22], participants estimated the (fixed) probability of reward attached to specific stimuli. At reward
feedback, a trial-novel image was presented. Subsequent memory performance for these trial-
novel images displayed an SRPE effect, which was more pronounced in adolescents than in
adults. In another study [24], participants tracked the reward associated with different indoor
and outdoor scenes. Here, a clear URPE effect was observed: scenes associated with a higher
URPE during the initial task (i.e., with more surprising rewards in either positive or negative
direction) were afterwards better remembered (Figure 1C,D).
A more challenging study [25] used a reward-prediction paradigm to disentangle effects of SRPE,
surprise (which corresponds to URPE), and uncertainty. Unlike in the other paradigms
just discussed, reward probability was not fixed but instead jumped to a different level at unpre-
dictable time points in the experiment. Only SRPE had an effect on subsequent memory
(Figure 1F; see also [26]). Finally, in the study by Wimmer et al. [23], the reward probability
would fluctuate slowly but unpredictably on each trial, making the reward-prediction task very
challenging. In this experiment, unlike the other discussed paradigms, a negative effect of (S)
RPE was observed. Specifically, trials (and participants) with stronger and more positive RPEs
were associated with impaired declarative learning.
As a second approach, in a multiple-repetition paradigm (Box 2), a set of general information
questions are repeated a number of times. Trial-specific confidence ratings (‘How certain are
you that you answered correctly?’) and feedback are used to compute trial-specific PEs. Given
that being correct is rewarding [25], these PEs can be considered RPEs. The researchers use
these RPEs to predict accuracy on subsequent presentations of the same general information
questions. Here, a URPE effect is typically observed. In particular, the hypercorrection effect
obtained in this multiple-repetition paradigm entails that errors made with high confidence are
beneficial for memory [27–31]. High-confidence errors occur on those trials during which positive
feedback was expected but not obtained; thus, this effect is consistent with a URPE effect.
Another experiment [32] also showed a hypercorrection effect, which the authors interpretedTrends in Cognitive Sciences, May 2020, Vol. 24, No. 5 391
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Trends in Cognitive Sciencesas a URPE. Additionally, in this second experiment, participants received false feedback on a
small fraction of trials (i.e., trials that were answered correctly but labelled as false) and received
novel feedback (i.e., a novel ‘correct’ answer) on those trials. In those false-feedback trials, a
URPE effect was also observed: On trials that were answered with high certainty but that were
not rewarded (high URPE), the novel feedback was subsequently recalled more confidently.
Overviewing and categorizing these paradigms, we note that a main difference between the
reward-prediction andmultiple-repetition approaches is the origin of the RPE: an independent re-
ward generation mechanism in the former and the participant’s own confidence in his or her
memory in the latter. Another difference is that, in the reward-prediction approach, RPEs are
usually computed or estimated, whereas RPEs are deduced from confidence measures in the
multiple-repetition approach. There are some exceptions to the latter rule. For example, Rouhani
et al. [24] implemented a reward-prediction paradigm where confidence is used to calculate an
RPE. Finally, in the reward-prediction paradigm, memoranda are usually trial-unique, whereas
(by definition) they are not in the multiple-repetition approach. These are just a few of the relevant
dimensions; we discuss some other potentially relevant dimensions in the next section.
Open Issues
Despite growing evidence that RPEs that drive declarative memory as well as nondeclarative
memory, many uncertainties remain. We discuss a few of them in the next subsections.
RPE: Signed or Unsigned?
Studies with a multiple-repetition paradigm typically observed URPE (i.e., surprise) effects. By
contrast, the reward-prediction paradigm has tended to yield SRPE effects, although URPE ef-
fects have occasionally been documented as well (Figure 1D) [24]. Why do different designs
tend to generate SRPE versus URPE effects on declarative learning? One potentially relevant fac-
tor is the range of the RPEs probed. In particular, studies that found a behavioral SRPE effect
(i.e., most reward-prediction paradigms) might simply not have investigated the full range of
RPEs. For example, in the variable-choice paradigm [20,33], the maximal SRPE equaled 0.75,
whereas the minimal SRPE was −0.50 (hence, lower in absolute value). It is possible that a larger
range of negative RPEs might lead to a URPE effect. This could be tested by including a few
nonrewarded one-option (high-certainty) trials. These highly infrequent events would be accom-
panied by large negative RPEs.
However, this is unlikely to be the full story, because both RPE signatures have been observed
even within a single study. In an electroencephalographic (EEG) study with the variable-choice
paradigm [33], a URPE pattern was observed during reward feedback in the theta (4–8 Hz) fre-
quency band, consistent with literature implicating theta in URPE processing [34]. By contrast,
SRPE signatures were found in the high-beta (20–30 Hz) and high-alpha (10–15 Hz) frequency
ranges, consistent with a functional role of both beta and alpha power in reward feedback pro-
cessing [35,36]. Furthermore, in an fMRI study using a multiple-repetition paradigm [32],
SRPE-consistent activation was found in several areas (including striatum), but URPE signatures
were found in others (including insula). Together, these findings suggest that both SRPE and
URPE are important for declarative learning and that we need an account identifying the functionalFigure 1. Reward-prediction approach applied in three paradigms and typical findings. (A) Variable-choice paradigm [20]. (B) Variable-choice paradigm behavioral results
[20] show a signed reward prediction error (SRPE) signature for recognition in both the immediate and delayed test groups. Recognition of word pairs increased linearly
with larger and more positive reward prediction errors (RPEs). (C) Paradigm reproduced from [24]. (D) Rouhani et al. [24] found a unsigned RPE signature, with memory
improving for both large negative and large positive RPEs. (E) Paradigm reproduced from [40]. (F) Jang et al. [40] found an SRPE signature: memory score increased
with increasing RPE.
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Trends in Cognitive Sciencesrole of each in time, (neural) space, and frequency band. The Bayesian learning model mentioned
in the introduction, which naturally incorporates both, may be a useful starting point in this
respect. Specifically, as this model suggests, it may be that URPE drives learning rate, SRPE
drives update, and their combination (learning rate × update) determines a PE that drives
declarative learning.
Timing Issues of RPEs
In most paradigms, a novel declarative memorandum is presented on each trial, followed by an
RPE, followed by declarative feedback about what the correct answer should have been (see
Figure 1A, word pair encoding, for an example). Here, RPE can have either a retrograde effect
(if it interacts with the originally presented memoranda), or instead an anterograde effect (if it inter-
acts with the declarative feedback). Concerning the anterograde effect, in studies using the
variable-choice paradigm, the declarative feedback appeared either simultaneously with the
RPE (delay of 0 ms [20]) or with a delay of 3000 ms [33]. The fact that we find very similar results
in the two cases suggests that the timing of the RPE-feedback interval may not be crucial, at least
within the first few hundreds of milliseconds. An interesting parallel can be drawn here with the
test-potentiated learning effect from the declarative memory literature. Here, taking a test poten-
tiates the learning of (old or novel) material that is subsequently presented [37,38]. Also, for a
retrograde effect (of RPE on originally presented memorandum), an interesting analogy can be
made with earlier literature. In particular, Braun et al. [39] found a retrograde effect of reward on
declarative memory, with objects that were (temporarily) closer to (subsequent) reward being
better remembered afterwards. In the reward-prediction approach, it remains to be shown
which of these two (anterograde or retrograde effect of RPE) is crucial for driving the RPE-
based declarative memory improvement.
An RPE can also appear at cue rather than at feedback. Only a single paper thus far has investi-
gated both cue- and feedback-locked RPE effects [40]. Those authors observed cue- but not
feedback-locked RPE effects; however, in their experiment, there was both a cue- and a
feedback-locked RPE on each trial. It is very well possible that an initial RPE suppresses a second
RPE occurring (e.g., a few hundred milliseconds later) in that same trial. We conclude that RPE
timing issues need to be studied more systematically. In particular, if this research is to have prac-
tical application in education, such studies will be imperative.
RPE: Why and How?
In nondeclarative learning, a normative argument for why RPE is useful is well established:
Calculating RPE is necessary for online (i.e., while interacting with the world) reward maximization
[3]; this idea is inherent in the RW, TD, and Pearce-Hall models (Box 1). Does this argument apply
to declarative memory as well? An intuitive argument is that it makes sense to only remember
stimuli (or more generally, episodes) that are associated with a reward level that is sufficiently
different fromwhat is already expected. Indeed, if a stimulus from some category is accompanied
by reward each time it is encountered, it makes little sense to explicitly remember each novel
stimulus instance as a separate event once it has already been learned.
Another issue is how RPE improves memory. One potential mechanism is via phase-locking to
neural oscillations in specific frequency bands. In particular, neural theta phase synchronization
may provide one (but not an exclusive) solution: Brain areas in theta phase synchrony are thought
to communicate and learn more efficiently [41], thus facilitating memory integration [42]. Indeed,
episodic memory is enhanced when multimodal (audiovisual) stimuli are synchronously presented
in theta phase, with stronger theta phase synchronization predicting better memory performance
[43,44]. Dopaminergic midbrain neurons have also been found to phase-lock to (cortical) theta394 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, May 2020, Vol. 24, No. 5
Outstanding Questions
Under which circumstances (e.g.,
experimental paradigm, population,
learning–test delay) is an SRPE versus
URPE signature in declarative memory
observed?
Most studies observe a beneficial
effect of (signed or unsigned) RPEs,
but RPEs may also impair subsequent
memory. Under which circumstances
are RPEs beneficial versus harmful for
learning?
Can we identify computational
principles from the TD learning model
in episodic memory? In particular, the
TD model predicts that learning occurs
when the reward prediction changes
across successive time steps (even in
the absence of actual reward).
Can the differentiation predicted by
Bayesian models of (nondeclarative)
learning (SRPE and URPE drive up-
dates and learning rates, respectively)
be observed in declarative learning?
What is the effect of test delay on
declarative memory? Does the RPE
effect increase or decrease after sleep?
Does RPE support memory via theta
phase synchronization?
What is the relationship between RPE
and testing effect for improving declara-
tive memory?
Can the concept of RPE advance
learning in education contexts?
How do reward-related disorders and
ageing influence the RPE effect on
declarative memory?
What are commonalities and differences
(e.g., in neural structures, behavioral
commonalities) between RPEs and
more general PEs?
Do RPEs have differential effects when
generated by the agent itself or by
another agent? when they are generated
for the agent or for another one?
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesduring encoding, with stronger phase-locking during subsequently remembered (versus forgotten)
memoranda [45]. Thus, it is possible that RPEs (via neuromodulatory signaling) increase theta
synchrony, which subsequently allows the relevant brain areas to ‘glue’ the episode together
more efficiently [46]. The EEG variable-choice paradigm study mentioned above [33] provides pre-
liminary evidence for this view. Further, computational models that consider RPE–theta interactions
to drive learning have started to appear [47].
Whereas dopaminergic RPEs likely support nondeclarative learning via basal ganglia pathways,
dopaminergic RPEsmay support declarative memory via the hippocampus [48]. Standard theory
holds that (dopaminergic) VTA calculates SRPE, but a substantial number of URPE neurons have
also been observed in VTA and nearby midbrain areas [49]. Moreover, also noradrenergic locus
coeruleus projects to the hippocampus and may thus exert URPE effects [50]. Earlier authors
proposed that VTA–hippocampus interactions originate in the hippocampus [51]. We propose
that VTA–hippocampus interactions may also originate in VTA and that SRPEs (encoded by
VTA, possibly based on input from ventral striatum [52]) and URPEs (encoded in VTA and
locus coeruleus) may modulate the hippocampus for episodic memory encoding. Consistently,
a number of studies have demonstrated that midbrain VTA activation (triggered by reward or
by RPE) is associated with improved episodic learning [21,53,54].
Effect of Test Delay on Declarative Memory
In declarative memory studies, participants are typically subjected to an implicit or explicit
memory test, either on the same day or after a considerable delay (ranging from a few hours to
a few weeks). If, as suggested above, SRPEs are encoded by dopaminergic neurons, then
effects should be stronger with longer delays. Indeed, although early and late long-term memory
effects both rely on dopamine, late effects have a stronger dependency on dopamine [48].
Consistently, an effect of reward in declarative learning is typically stronger after a delay [55,56].
However, a systematic comparison of the delay-by-RPE interaction on declarative memory
remains to be carried out.
Reconsolidation
When information is retrieved from memory, it enters a plastic, labile state, allowing the informa-
tion to be changed, strengthened, or weakened, a process called ‘reconsolidation’ [57,58].
Reconsolidation is most intensively studied in nondeclarative memory [59], but it is observed in
declarative memory as well [60]. PE is required for reconsolidation [61], both in nondeclarative
memory [62] and in declarative memory [60,63]. Given the important role of RPE in declarative
learning, and given that similar principles drive learning and reconsolidation [63], we predict that
RPE may modulate reconsolidation, too. The multiple-repetition approach, where declarative
memory is probed iteratively, can be considered as a first attempt at investigating RPEs in the
context of reconsolidation. This remains, however, to be further investigated.
Concluding Remarks
Learning, RPEs, and declarative memory are sometimes treated as separate topics, each with
their own prominent paradigms, findings, and theories. The current perspective suggests instead
that they are intimately related. Briefly, learning is modulated by RPEs and leads to (declarative)
memory traces in the brain. We discussed a few recent paradigms that have begun to explore
such interactions. In the Open Issues section, we highlighted a number of dimensions of those
paradigms that, if addressed, could greatly facilitate further development of the research field.
Although much remains to be found out (see Outstanding Question), concrete models and pre-
dictions are beginning to emerge, with relevance for both natural and artificial intelligence.
Concerning the latter, it is of interest that recent deep neural networks integrate nondeclarativeTrends in Cognitive Sciences, May 2020, Vol. 24, No. 5 395
Trends in Cognitive Scienceslearning (as in standard neural networks) with declarative memory [64,65]. In such artificial sys-
tems, RPEs may determine when (or how strongly) to store a declarative memorandum. We
are excited about what the (near) future will bring in this domain, not only because of its concep-
tual unification but also because of its promise for informing education policy and practice.
Acknowledgments
K.E. and T.V. were supported by project G012816N from the Research Council Flanders (FWO). K.E. is a research fellow
at the Research Council Flanders. E.D.L. and T.V. were supported by project BOF17-GOA-004 awarded by the Ghent
University Research Council.
References
1. Squire, L.R. (2004) Memory systems of the brain: a brief history
and current perspective. Neurobiol. Learn. Mem. 82, 171–177
2. Wang, J.X. et al. (2018) Prefrontal cortex as a meta-
reinforcement learning system. Nat. Neurosci. 21, 860–868
3. Sutton, R.S. and Barto, A.G. (2018) Reinforcement Learning: An
Introduction, MIT Press
4. Rao, R.P. and Ballard, D.H. (1999) Predictive coding in the visual
cortex: a functional interpretation of some extra-classical
receptive-field effects. Nat. Neurosci. 2, 79–87
5. Friston, K.J. (2003) Learning and inference in the brain. Neural
Netw. 16, 1325–1352
6. Den Ouden, H.E.M. et al. (2012) How prediction errors shape
perception, attention, and motivation. Front. Psychol. 3, 548
7. Rescorla, R.A. and Wagner, A.R. (1972) A theory of Pavlovian
conditioning: variations in the effectiveness of reinforcement
and nonreinforcement. In Classical Conditioning II: Current
Research and Theory (Blake, A.H. and Prokasy, W.F., eds),
pp. 64–99, Appleton-Century-Croft
8. Ljungberg, T. et al. (1992) Responses of monkey dopamine neurons
during learning of behavioral reactions. J. Neurophysiol. 67, 145–163
9. Eshel, N. et al. (2016) Dopamine neurons share common
response function for reward prediction error. Nat. Neurosci.
19, 479–486
10. Mnih, V. et al. (2015) Human-level control through deep
reinforcement learning. Nature 518, 529–533
11. Silver, D. et al. (2016) Mastering the game of Go with deep neural
networks and tree search. Nature 529, 484–489
12. Pearce, J.M. and Hall, G. (1980) A model for Pavlovian learning:
variations in the effectiveness of conditioned but not of uncondi-
tioned stimuli. Psychol. Rev. 87, 532–552
13. Dayan, P. et al. (2000) Learning and selective attention. Nat.
Neurosci. 3 Suppl, 1218–1223
14. Behrens, T.E.J. et al. (2007) Learning the value of information in
an uncertain world. Nat. Neurosci. 10, 1214–1221
15. Silvetti, M. et al. (2018) Dorsal anterior cingulate-brainstem
ensemble as a reinforcement meta-learner. PLoS Comput.
Biol. 14, e1006370
16. Courville, A.C. et al. (2006) Bayesian theories of conditioning in a
changing world. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 294–300
17. Roesch, M.R. et al. (2012) Surprise! Neural correlates of Pearce –
Hall and Rescorla – Wagner coexist within the brain. Eur.
J. Neurosci. 35, 1190–1200
18. Mason, A. et al. (2017) Adaptive scaling of reward in episodic
memory: a replication study. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 70, 2306–2318
19. Mason, A. et al. (2017) The role of reward and reward uncer-
tainty in episodic memory. J. Mem. Lang. 96, 62–77
20. De Loof, E. et al. (2018) Signed reward prediction errors drive
declarative learning. PLoS One 13, e0189212
21. Buc Calderon, C. et al. (2020) Signed reward prediction errors in the
ventral striatum drive episodic memory. BioRxiv 2020.01.03.893578
22. Davidow, J.Y. et al. (2016) An upside to reward sensitivity: the
hippocampus supports enhanced reinforcement learning in
adolescence. Neuron 92, 93–99
23. Wimmer, G.E. et al. (2014) Episodic memory encoding interferes
with reward learning and decreases striatal prediction errors.
J. Neurosci. 34, 14901–14912
24. Rouhani, N. et al. (2018) Dissociable effects of surprising re-
wards on learning and memory. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem.
Cogn. 44, 1430–1443
25. Satterthwaite, T.D. et al. (2012) Being right is its own reward:
load and performance related ventral striatum activation to
correct responses during a working memory task in youth.
Neuroimage 61, 723–729
26. Aberg, K.C. et al. (2017) Trial-by-trial modulation of associative
memory formation by reward prediction error and reward anticipa-
tion as revealed by a biologically plausible computational model.
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 11, 56
27. Metcalfe, J. (2017) Learning from errors. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 68,
465–489
28. Metcalfe, J. and Finn, B. (2011) People’s hypercorrection of
high-confidence errors: did they know it all along? J. Exp.
Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 37, 437–448
29. Butterfield, B. and Metcalfe, J. (2006) The correction of errors
committed with high confidence.Metacognition Learn. 1, 69–84
30. Fazio, L.K. and Marsh, E.J. (2009) Surprising feedback improves
later memory. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 16, 88–92
31. Butterfield, B. and Metcalfe, J. (2001) Errors committed with high
confidence are hypercorrected. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem.
Cogn. 27, 1491–1494
32. Pine, A. et al. (2018) Knowledge acquisition is governed by
striatal prediction errors. Nat. Commun. 9, 1673
33. Ergo, K. et al. (2019) Oscillatory signatures of reward prediction
errors in declarative learning. Neuroimage 186, 137–145
34. Cavanagh, J.F. and Frank, M.J. (2014) Frontal theta as a mecha-
nism for cognitive control. Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 414–421
35. Kleberg, F.I. et al. (2014) Ongoing theta oscillations predict
encoding of subjective memory type. Neurosci. Res. 83, 69–80
36. HajiHosseini, A. et al. (2012) The role of beta-gamma oscillations
in unexpected rewards processing. Neuroimage 60, 1678–1685
37. Arnold, K.M. and Mcdermott, K.B. (2013) Test-potentiated
learning: distinguishing between direct and indirect effects of
tests. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 39, 940–945
38. Pastötter, B. and Bäuml, K.T. (2014) Retrieval practice enhances
new learning: the forward effect of testing. Front. Psychol. 5, 286
39. Braun, E.K. et al. (2018) Retroactive and graded prioritization of
memory by reward. Nat. Commun. 9, 4886
40. Jang, A.I. et al. (2019) Positive reward prediction errors during
decision-making strengthen memory encoding. Nat. Hum.
Behav. 3, 719–732
41. Fries, P. (2015) Rhythms for cognition: communication through
coherence. Neuron 88, 220–235
42. Backus, A.R. et al. (2016) Hippocampal-prefrontal theta oscilla-
tions support memory integration. Curr. Biol. 26, 450–457
43. Wang, D. et al. (2018) Single-trial phase entrainment of theta
oscillations in sensory regions predicts human associative
memory performance. J. Neurosci. 38, 6299–6309
44. Clouter, A. et al. (2017) Theta phase synchronization is the
glue that binds human associative memory. Curr. Biol. 27,
3143–3148
45. Kaminski, J. et al. (2018) Novelty-sensitive dopaminergic
neurons in the human substantia nigra predict success of
declarative memory formation. Curr. Biol. 28, 1333–1343
46. Berens, S.C. and Horner, A.J. (2017) Theta rhythm: temporal
glue for episodic memory. Curr. Biol. 27, R1110–R1112
47. Verbeke, P. and Verguts, T. (2019) Learning to synchronize: how
biological agents can couple neural task modules for dealing
with the stability-plasticity dilemma. PLoS Comput. Biol. 15,
e1006604396 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, May 2020, Vol. 24, No. 5
Trends in Cognitive Sciences48. Lisman, J.E. et al. (2011) A neoHebbian framework for episodic
memory: role of dopamine-dependent late LTP. Trends
Neurosci. 34, 536–547
49. Matsumoto, M. and Hikosaka, O. (2009) Two types of dopamine
neuron distinctly convey positive and negative motivational
signals. Nature 459, 837–841
50. Wagatsuma, A. et al. (2018) Locus coeruleus input to hippocam-
pal CA3 drives single-trial learning of a novel context. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 115, E310–E316
51. Lisman, J.E. and Grace, A. (2005) The hippocampal-VTA loop:
controlling the entry of information into long-termmemory. Neuron
46, 703–713
52. Takahashi, Y.K. et al. (2016) Temporal specificity of reward pre-
diction errors signaled by putative dopamine neurons in rat VTA
depends on ventral striatum. Neuron 91, 182–193
53. Wittmann, B.C. et al. (2005) Reward-related FMRI activation
of dopaminergic midbrain is associated with enhanced
hippocampus-dependent long-term memory formation. Neuron
45, 459–467
54. Gruber, M.J. et al. (2016) Post-learning hippocampal dynamics
promote preferential retention of rewarding events. Neuron 89,
1110–1120
55. Patil, A. et al. (2016) Reward retroactively enhances memory
consolidation for related items. Learn. Mem. 24, 65–69
56. Miendlarzewska, E.A. et al. (2016) Influence of reward motivation
on human declarative memory. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 61,
156–176
57. Alberini, C.M. and Ledoux, J.E. (2013) Memory reconsolidation.
Curr. Biol. 23, R746–R750
58. Fernández, R.S. et al. (2016) The fate of memory:
reconsolidation and the case of prediction error. Neurosci.
Biobehav. Rev. 68, 423–441
59. Nader, K. et al. (2000) Fear memories require protein synthesis in
the amygdala for reconsolidation after retrieval. Nature 406,
722–726
60. Sinclair, A.H. and Barense, M.D. (2018) Surprise and destabilize:
prediction error influences episodic memory reconsolidation.
Learn. Mem. 25, 369–381
61. Exton-McGuinness, M.T.J. et al. (2015) Updating memories –
the role of prediction errors in memory reconsolidation. Behav.
Brain Res. 278, 375–384
62. Sevenster, D. et al. (2013) Prediction error governs pharmaco-
logically induced amnesia for learned fear. Science 339,
830–833
63. Sinclair, A.H. and Barense, M.D. (2019) Prediction error and
memory reactivation: how incomplete reminders drive
reconsolidation. Trends Neurosci. 42, 727–739
64. Graves, A. et al. (2016) Hybrid computing using a neural network
with dynamic external memory. Nature 538, 471–476
65. Botvinick, M. et al. (2019) Reinforcement learning, fast and slow.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 23, 408–422
66. Eichenbaum, H. (2004) Hippocampus: cognitive processes and
neural representations that underlie declarative memory. Neuron
44, 109–120
67. Metcalfe, J. et al. (2012) Neural correlates of peopleʼs hypercor-
rection of their false beliefs. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 24, 1571–1583
68. Bunzeck, N. et al. (2010) A common mechanism for adaptive
scaling of reward and novelty.Hum. BrainMapp. 1394, 1380–1394Trends in Cognitive Sciences, May 2020, Vol. 24, No. 5 397
